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VIRGINIA'S NEW MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANEL
AND SOME QUESTIONS IT RAISES
Thomas J. Harlan, Jr.*
Historically, attorneys would claim that in potential medical mal-
practice cases, it was difficult, if not impossible, to proceed against
a defendant doctor. The so-called "conspiracy of silence" existed,
causing the refusal of other doctors to serve as expert medical wit-
nesses to prove that the defendant fell below the standard of reason-
able care. This has not been true in Virginia for some time. In 1962,
by a joint effort of the Virginia State Bar and the Medical Society
of Virginia, a "Joint Screening Panel" was established. Its two-fold
purpose was (1) to prevent frivolous claims from being filed against
physicians and (2) to assist in the disposition of claims which ap-
peared to be reasonably well-founded.' Under the provisions of the
Joint Screening Panel, a successful plaintiff would be given the
names of three physicians who were experts in the same field as the
defendant doctor. These physicians were urged by the Medical So-
ciety of Virginia to appear in court as expert witnesses for the plain-
tiff to testify against the defendant doctor if the panel found the
claim to be of some merit.2
Several years ago, because the Virginia Joint Screening Panel felt
that it was being used as a "fishing expedition" by some attorneys
who would bring cases before it, suffer an adverse decision and then
proceed to file suit against the defendant doctor, a rule was added
requiring the plaintiff's attorney to withdraw from the case in the
face of an adverse ruling. After the implementation of this rule, the
Joint Screening Panel's caseload dropped to only a few cases per
year.
Since 1970 the number of medical malpractice suits has increased
tremendously.' Likewise, the insurance rates for malpractice have
* B.A., University of Richmond, 1953; J.D., 1961. Partner, Doumar, Pincus, Knight &
Harlan, Norfolk, Virginia.
1. JOINT MEDICAL-LEGAL PLAN FOR SCREENING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES (1962). Virginia
was among the states of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey and New York
having such a panel, although the rules varied somewhat from state to state.
2. Id.
3. For a thorough discussion of the medical malpractice problem in general see Symposium
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increased rapidly., Confronted with the growing malpractice crisis,-
the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation in 1976 suppos-
edly to deal with the problem. After considering several alterna-
tives,6 the legislature decided to create medical malpractice review
panels with extensive statutory power.7 The act drastically changed
the previous concept and scope of the Joint Screening Panel. This
article will first discuss the various aspects of these new statutes and
then will address several problems posed by them.
I. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
The Act covers all aspects of health care administered by the
"health care provider" (HCP). These terms are liberally defined by
the legislature to cover virtually all in the medical field.' As a
condition precedent to the bringing of a malpractice suit against an
HCP, the claimant is required to notify the HCP in writing when
the alleged malpractice occurred. The claimant must also describe
the act or acts of the alleged malpractice.' The written notice starts
on Medical Malpractice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1177. In Virginia the number of claims per 100
doctors rose from 2.6 in 1969 to 7.2 in 1975. The average claim paid increased from $4,182.03
in 1969 to $10,190.66 in 1975. SCC, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN VIRGINIA: THE SCOPE
AND SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 19 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SCC
REPORT]. Hospitals also experienced a similar increase. Id. at 23.
4. Approximately 80%, or about 4,100, of Virginia's doctors are insured by St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company. In 1967, the average premiums for $100,000/300,000 limits
were $93 for the lowest risk category of doctor and $308 for the highest risk category. In 1975,
the premiums for these categories were $433 and $2,728 respectively, an increase ranging from
366% for the former category to 786% for the latter. SCC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
5. It should be noted that part of the malpractice problem was created by the legislature
itself when it restricted the charitable immunity of hospitals in negligence cases in 1974. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-629.2 (Repl. Vol. 1974). See 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 401 (1975). It is estimated that
this statute has caused a 124% increase in the premiums of a charitable hospital, up from an
estimated $50 to $75 per bed to $112 per bed for the basic limits of $25,000/75,000. SCC
REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
6. Among other suggestions were (1) a hospital- and/or physician-owned insurance com-
pany; (2) a state-managed fund; and (3) compelling insurance companies to provide regulated
coverage with a provision for sharing losses or gains. SCC REPORT, supra note 3, at 36-44. This
last alternative, known as a Joint Underwriters Association (JUA), has been adopted in
approximately 15 states. Id. at 44.
7. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-911 to -922 (Cum. Supp. 1976). These statutes became effective on
July 1, 1976.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-911 (Cum. Supp. 1976). "Health care provider" includes doctors,
dentists, nurses, physical therapy assistants, clinical psychologists and other related medical
professions. Id.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-912 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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a clock and the claimant or the HCP may thereafter file a written
request within sixty days to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Virginia that the case be reviewed by the Medical Review Panel.
The claimant is prohibited from bringing a lawsuit within a ninety-
day period after his original notification to the HCP. If there has
been a request for review filed with the Chief Justice, the litigation
cannot be brought during the pendency of that review.'" Once notice
of a claim has been given, the applicable statute of limitations" is
automatically tolled for 120 days.12 If a review is requested, the
tolling of the statute of limitations continues until sixty days after
the issuance of an opinion by the review panel or for the full 120 days
subsequent to the original notice to the HCP, whichever is later.'3
Thus, there is no danger of losing a cause of action for malpractice
under the provisions of the Act.
If neither the claimant nor the HCP requests a review panel
within sixty days then the claimant may file suit and the case will
proceed like any other suit for personal injuries. However, if either
10. Id. The request must be mailed to the Chief Justice by either registered or certified
mail. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-919 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The statute is silent as to whether or not
copies of the request for review directed to the Chief Justice should be mailed to the then-
unrepresented HCP or to the attorney representing the claimant. Presumably the specifics
of notification will be covered by the Rules of the Supreme Court which will be drafted to
implement these statutes. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
11. In Virginia an injured party must bring suit on a malpractice claim within two years
after the act which causes the injury. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This is true
even if the individual sues under the theory of breach of implied warranty which otherwise
carries a three-year statute of limitations. Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, 208 Va.
700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968). Furthermore, it should be noted that, absent fraudulent conceal-
ment of the injury by the doctor, the statute of limitations starts to run when the wrong is
done and not when it is subsequently discovered by the injured party. Hawks v. DeHart, 206
Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966) (cause of action accrued when pin was left in plaintiff's neck
and not when subsequently discovered 16 years later by the plaintiff). The only exceptions
to this rule are when the injured patient is insane or a minor at the time of the injury. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-30 (Repl. Vol. 1957). The statute starts to run against them only after the
disability is removed (i.e., he or she becomes sane or reaches majority), although no cause of
action can exist more than twenty years after the injury accrues. Id. Medical malpractice
claims by minors are not unusual. In the twelve months prior to September, 1975, St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Company had five claims filed against it involving minors not
subject to the two-year statute of limitations, all of which resulted from incidents prior to
1966. SCC REPORT, supra note 3, at 26.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-919 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Notice is deemed to be given when hand-
delivered or mailed by registered or certified mail to the doctor's office, residence or last
known address. Id.
13. Id.
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party requests a review panel, then the primary function of the Act
comes into play.'"
The panel consists of three impartial attorneys and three impar-
tial HCP's, licensed and actively practicing their professions in the
congressional district where suit, based on proper venue, would be
brought. The panel will have a circuit court judge, appointed by the
Chief Justice, serving as chairman, who will have no vote unless the
panel is deadlocked.' 5 The difficulty with this particular section is
that the attorneys and the physicians who are called upon to sit
on the panel will be from the same congressional district as the
defendant doctor. There would seem to be greater difficulty as to
impartiality than there would be if panel members were brought in
from outside the defendant's area. Indeed, it may be simpler to
import a panel than to try to find an impartial panel from the same
district. However, the statutory construction seems merely to codify
the case law in Virginia that the standard of due medical care of an
HCP must be measured by the reasonable standard of care exer-
cised by other HCP's in the same or similar locality. 8 Naturally,
those physicians who practice in the same congressional district as
the defendant can best evaluate the local standard of care.
It is not necessary for the panel to hold a hearing, although either
party may request one." Regardless of whether a hearing is held or
not, each party must submit evidence to the panel which may con-
sist of various medical data, excerpts from treatises and depositions
of witnesses.'" Copies of the evidence must be submitted to each
14. Although the basic guidelines for proceeding with a malpractice claim are incorporated
by the Act, the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court has been given the responsibility
for promulgating all necessary rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of the Act.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-921 (Cum. Supp. 1976). These rules will make the statutes functional.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-913 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The panel is selected by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice is to be given a list of HCP's by the State Board of
Medicine and a list of attorneys by the Virginia State Bar. The statute specifically instructs
the Chief Justice to give due consideration to the nature of the claim and the HCP's practice
in selecting the panel. Id.
16. Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918). See also Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va.
645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976) (specialist from Philadelphia not competent to testify as to medical
standards in Prince William County, Va.); Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71, 225 S.E.2d 387
(1976) (specialist from Washington, D.C. incompetent to testify as to medical standards in
Norfolk, Va.).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-915 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-914 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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member of the panel, and both parties shall have access to all
materials submitted.1 9
In a simple medical malpractice case, one that has a rather small
medical record, this would certainly not be burdensome. However,
many of the medical malpractice cases consist of two or three
hundred pages of hospital records. To require that all of these be
copied nine times (seven-member panel, plus two attorneys) could
be prohibitively expensive. Indeed, many hospitals are now charg-
ing $1.00 per page for reproducing hospital records. Coupled with
the cost problem of reproducing evidence, the statute provides that
each member of the panel be paid $25.00 per diem as well as reim-
bursed for his out-of-pocket expenses.2" The statute goes on to say
that the per diem and expenses of the panel shall be borne by the
parties in such proportions as may be determined by the chairman
in his discretion. How does the panel get paid if the claimant loses
and the chairman assesses costs against the claimant who is indi-
gent? Also, consider the costs that might be involved in bringing a
case before the panel if a medical record consisted of 200 pages and
the reproduction cost of most hospitals is $1.00 per page. With seven
members on the panel, each having a copy, plus the $150.00 per
diem total cost for the six members of the panel (the judge is sala-
ried), plus their out-of-pocket expenses, what this would cost the
HCP or the claimant might be better spent in filing suit. In cases
where the records are voluminous it may be necessary to lower the
number of copies required, provided all members of the panel have
access to them."
While either party can request a hearing, it is within the panel's
discretion to determine whether a hearing on the claim is war-
ranted.2 If it determines that a hearing is warranted, the panel will
conduct a hearing on the claim after due notification of the parties.
The hearing is regulated by statute.Y The panel may hear witnesses,
19. Id.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-920 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
21. Actually there is some question as to which party should bear the cost of producing
evidence. Should each party bear his own cost or should the proponent of the medical review
panel bear the expense? Although section 8-920 could be construed so as to imply that the
chairman can determine who should bear the costs, the question will hopefully be resolved
by the rules drafted by the Virginia Supreme Court. See note 14 supra.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-915 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-916 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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issue subpoenas, sanction depositions and gather other evidence as
needed."4 However, the two most important aspects of this hearing
are that (1) the rules of evidence need not be observed and (2) a
majority of the panel may render an opinion.25
Upon receiving all the evidence, whether in a hearing or other-
wise, the panel has thirty days to reach one or more of four possible
conclusions. 2 The panel may decide (1) the claim is without merit;
(2) the HCP failed to exercise the appropriate care needed and that
the injuries to the claimant were a proximate result of the failure;
(3) the HCP failed to exercise due care but that the injuries were
not caused by such failure; or (4) there is a substantial question of
fact on the question of liability which does not require expert opin-
ion but should be tried before a judge or jury. This last possibility
covers the situation where the case involves a "swearing contest,"
wherein the claimant states the HCP did or did not do a certain
thing, and the HCP disputes that contention. Here the panel need
not conduct an extensive review before allowing the litigants to
proceed to court over the questions of fact. The statute further
states that if the panel finds negligence on the part of the HCP and
that it is a proximate cause of the claimant's damages, then "the
panel may determine whether the claimant suffered any disability
or impairment and the degree and extent thereof."' The panel's
finding is to be put into writing and shall be signed by all concurring
panelists. Any member of the panel may note his dissent and the
opinion shall be mailed to the claimant and the HCP within five
days after it is rendered.29
24. The wording of section 8-916 is somewhat ambiguous in that it does not definitely state
whether a party can be called as a witness by the panel. Each party is allowed to be heard,
but it is unclear whether the party can be cross-examined. The wording of the statute would
seem to imply that there can be no cross-examination of a party. However, since the rules of
evidence do not apply, it would seem that at least the panel could ask either party questions
as it sees fit.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-916 (Cum. Supp. 1976). For a discussion of potential problems with
this result see notes 53-69 infra and accompanying text.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-917.A. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
27. Id. The wording of the statute implies that the several listed potential opinions, to-
gether with the degree and extent of impairment, are the only opinions that the panel may
render. No provision is made in this statute for the panel's opinion to elaborate as to the facts
upon which its opinion is based.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-917.B. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-917.C. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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Once the panel has rendered its decision, the claimant may then
file his cause of action in the appropriate court if he still desires to
do so. However, the most significant aspect of the Act comes into
play at this point: The panel's decision may be introduced into
evidence at any subsequent action in a court of law.'" The opinion
of the panel is not conclusive, and either party may call any member
of the panel as a witness. If called, the statute mandates that the
witness appear and testify." The impact of this section will be quite
profound if the legislative enactment withstands the almost certain
constitutional challenge which will be discussed later in this arti-
cle.3 Although the trial is to proceed like any other civil action for
personal injuries, the introduction of the panel's opinion into evi-
dence and the calling of the panel's members as witnesses will un-
doubtedly affect the format. In addition to a change in trial tactics,
there will also be a limit on how much one may recover from a
malpractice claim. The legislature has placed a ceiling of $750,000
for recovery on any injury or death resulting from an act of medical
malpractice occurring after April 1, 1977.33
As an alternative to the procedure just described above, the Act
allows persons to proceed under section 8-503 et seq. of the Code34
and arbitrate medical malpractice claims provided that the patient
or claimant is allowed to withdraw by the terms of the arbitration
agreement itself, if the claimant withdraws from the terms of the
agreement within sixty days after the "termination of the health
care."
35
Apparently this section will allow doctors, as a condition preced-
ent to their treatment of patients, to ask the patient to sign an
arbitration agreement which will be binding so long as there is a
distinct provision in the arbitration agreement that the claimant
may withdraw within sixty days after the termination of such care.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-918 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
31. Id. The panelists will appear at the expense of the calling party and have absolute
immunity from civil liability for all acts done within the scope of their duty under the Act.
Id.
32. See notes 40-69 infra and accompanying text.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976). For a discussion of potential problems
with this section as well as a review of past recoveries in Virginia see notes 70-74 infra and
accompanying text.
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-503 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-922.A. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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If the patient signs the agreement and then does not withdraw from
his agreement within the specified time, he will be bound to
arbitrate any medical malpractice issues that subsequently arise.36
This is a drastic change in the law of medical malpractice. It raises
the question of whether the arbitration agreement usurps the court's
jurisdiction to try medical malpractice cases where the claimant has
failed to make a timely withdrawal from the terms of the arbitration
agreement. If the parties choose to arbitrate, the matter may be
heard by a panel appointed under the provisions of the Act. Fur-
thermore, an insurer of the HCP can be bound by the decision of
the arbitration panel if the insurer agrees in advance to be so
bound.18
Although the true impact of this section of the Act cannot be
measured at this time, if the medical malpractice review panels gain
a high degree of respectability among the medical profession, it
would seem that arbitration agreements would become more com-
monplace. On the other hand, plaintiffs can be expected to chal-
lenge the validity of the statute on the ground that it unconstitu-
tionally usurps judicial power 9 or at least that the sixty-day time
period is unreasonably short.
II. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
While there may be a definite need for legislation of this type,"
the present Act poses several problems. First, there is the general
question of whether the legislature has unduly usurped judicial pow-
ers in violation of the Virginia Constitution. Second, the admissibil-
ity into evidence of the opinion of the panel raises several serious
questions. Third, the limitation of the ad damnum in a medical
malpractice case to $750,000 raises constitutional issues. All three
problems are somewhat interrelated as far as their constitutionality
is concerned, while each poses different practical problems.
36. Id. The statute makes ample provision for the situation where the claimant is an infant
or is insane. Also, death would appear to automatically terminate the agreement or at least
cause the sixty-day period not to start running until a personal representative is appointed.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-922.B. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-922.C. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
39. For a discussion of the constitutionality of this section see notes 40-74 infra and accom-
panying text.
40. For an analysis of laws in other states see Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative
Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1917.
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The Constitution of Virginia clearly distinguishes between the
judicial and legislative branches of government, stating in part:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Su-
preme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdic-
tion subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may
from time to time establish. . . .,
The power of the legislature is also expressly limited in regard to
judicial functions:
The General Assembly . . . shall not, by special legislation, grant
relief in . . . cases of which courts . . . may have jurisdiction ....
The General Assembly shall not enact any local, special or private
law in the following cases: . . . (3) Regulating the practice in, or the
jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial pro-
ceeding or inquiry before the courts or other tribunals .... 11
In creating the authority for the medical malpractice review pan-
els, the legislature has seemingly pressed its power to its constitu-
tional limits. Since the judicial power is vested in the courts of the
Commonwealth, any legislation which substantially alters an indi-
vidual's access to the courts to seek redress of a wrong such as a
malpractice claim will certainly be scrutinized closely by those
courts. Under the police power of the state, the legislature can take
certain steps necessary to alleviate impending problems, but the
constitutional separation of powers must be strictly followed in a
constitutional society.
The first problem with the statute is that it has given judicial
powers to nonjudicial individuals by empowering the panel to hear
evidence and decide questions of law and fact.3 Although the panel
is supposedly conducting a preliminary review, the question it is
addressing is the central issue of the case. As such, it is performing
a judicial function which would seem to be in violation of the Con-
stitution.44 Indeed, the situation is somewhat similar to the problem
41. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (emphasis added).
42. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
43. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-913 to -917 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
44. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
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in the probate of wills that arose in the early 1900's. The legislature
had authorized clerks of the courts to probate wills. 5 The Supreme
Court of Virginia threw out this statute as an unconstitutional inva-
sion of the judicial powers." The Constitution was subsequently
amended so that clerks of courts can now probate wills," but it took
a constitutional mandate before this change was allowed. The same
analysis would seem to apply here.
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted this same line of reasoning
in striking down its medical malpractice statute." The court noted
that the application of legal principles is inherently a function of the
judiciary and since the state constitution vested judicial power ex-
clusively in the courts, the power given to the nonjudicial members
of the panel rendered the statute unconstitutional.49 The powers
given to the nonjudicial members of the panel under the Virginia
statutes are virtually identical to the Illinois statute.
The Supreme Court of Florida was faced with a similar statute
and found it constitutional." While not directly addressing the issue
of whether judicial power had been usurped, the court held that
submission of a medical malpractice case to a three-man panel, as
a condition precedent to trial, was a proper exercise of the police
power of the state in view of the problems created by the high cost
of malpractice insurance. The court stated that the burden upon the
claimant forced to go "to two trials," in effect, "reaches the outer
limits of constitutional tolerance,""1 but does not go beyond them.
Moreover, that court likened the medical malpractice review panel
to a "mandatory pre-trial settlement conference. 12 The Florida
court based its decision on the police power of the state which is
available in the area of public health and welfare and such statutes
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 2639a (1904) (now repealed).
46. McCurdy v. Smith, 107 Va. 757, 60 S.E. 78 (1908).
47. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 101 (as amended 1902) (replaced by the 1971 Constitution). See
Saunders v. Link, 114 Va. 285, 76 S.E. 327 (1912) (upholding the new amendment).
48. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
49. Id.
50. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
51. Id. at 806.
52. Justice England pointed out in his concurring opinion that the legislature had already
effectively diminished the judiciary's role by laws allowing "no-fault" divorces, "no-fault"
insurance and by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. Id. at 808 (concurring opinion).
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accordingly were an attempt by the legislature to regulate public
health and welfare in view of the medical malpractice crisis.
The opposite reasoning of the Illinois and Florida courts indicates,
perhaps, that the constitutionality of a statute regarding the
infringement of judicial power depends somewhat on the deference
given to the legislature. The obvious argument in favor of the stat-
ute's constitutionality on the issue of judicial infringement is that
the claimant can eventually get to court so that he is not denied his
right to judicial review; instead, it is merely postponed. Of course,
the argument does not fare as well against the section of the Act
regarding arbitration. Sixty days is a very short time period to dis-
cover an injury and withdraw from an arbitration agreement. Con-
ceivably, the claimant may not discover an alleged action for medi-
cal malpractice until well after the time for withdrawal has passed.
This could relegate the bulk of all medical malpractice claims to an
arbitration process, preempting the court's jurisdiction thereby,
which may or may not be constitutional. While an arbitration agree-
ment is a contractual relationship, the subject matter is a tort in
this case and the sixty-day limit seems unreasonably short,
particularly in view of the average claimant's ignorance of the law
at the time he would enter into such an agreement.
If the general thrust of the statute is upheld, the next problem
would seem to be the section which allows the opinion of the panel
to be introduced as evidence in a subsequent trial. 3 The impact
of such an opinion raises many potential questions. The Virginia
Constitution states
that in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man
and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held
sacred .... 1
Undoubtedly, the introduction of the panel's opinion will sub-
stantially influence the jury to such an extent as to be unconstitu-
tional,55 even though the opinion is not to be conclusive. 5 For exam-
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-918 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
54. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 11.
55. It is interesting to note that the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the creation of a
medical malpractice panel was an unconstitutional invasion into the province of a trial by
1976]
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ple, it is inconceivable that any instruction from the trial court
could have the effect of making such opinion only advisory to the
members of a medical malpractice jury when the composition of the
panel includes in its membership a circuit court judge, a person
held in high regard by jurors. Since a trial by jury "ought to be held
sacred,"5 it would seem that the introduction of the panel's opinion
would be unconstitutional because of the undue influence it is
bound to exert over the jurors.
There are two cases which have come out of the Supreme Court
of Queens County of the State of New York which address this
precise issue." The cases were from different courts within the same
division. The first case, Halpern v. Gozan,-9 held that the introduc-
tion into evidence of the panel's unanimous finding was not an
invalid invasion of the jury's province."0 However, the second court6'
reached the opposite conclusion, stating:
The court believes that to anticipate anything less than a full and
complete adoption by the jury of the panel's recommendation as to
liability is unrealistic and strains credulity. To allow the panel's rec-
ommendation to be introduced into evidence would nullify plaintiff s
constitutional right to a meaningful jury trial. That portion of the
statute permitting introduction of the panel's recommendation at
trial is unconstitutional. 2
Obviously this issue will require further litigation in New York and
elsewhere, and the Virginia Supreme Court will undoubtedly have
to decide it as well.
Even if the Supreme Court of Virginia does not feel that the Act
is an unconstitutional infringement on the right to a jury trial, there
are other problems with introducing the opinion into evidence. In-
jury, even though in Illinois the opinion could not be introduced at the subsequent trial. The
court reasoned that to require a litigant to first go to a panel before going to trial was an
impermissible restraint on the right to a jury trial. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n,
63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-918 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
57. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
58. It should be noted that these decisions were not rendered by the highest court of New
York, the Court of Appeals.
59. 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
60. Id.
61. Comiskey v. Arlen, 45 U.S.L.W. 2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 2, 1976).
62. Id. at 2020.
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deed, the use of an opinion as evidence could be seen as changing
the rules of evidence in a judicial proceeding by special legislation
in violation of the Virginia Constitution.6 3 For example, since the
panel can make a determination without a hearing,64 the net effect
is to allow a naked opinion to be introduced at the trial of the case
without the ability of the party who is adverse to the opinion to
present evidence or cross-examine witnesses at the panel level.
The problem becomes even more complex when the panel holds
a hearing where the rules of evidence do not apply.6 5 It is under-
standable why the legislature would want to relax the rules of evi-
dence, presumably because it does not want to make this a formal
"trial." Should the panel's opinion be based on inadmissible evi-
dence, it follows that the opinion itself would be inadmissible in the
absence of these sanctioning statutes. Is this not changing the rules
of evidence in a judicial proceeding? For example, under the modem
"shop book" rule of evidence, a nurse making an entry in a hospital
record that the ambulance driver informed her that the patient lost
two pints of blood en route to the hospital would be inadmissible at
trial." In deciding whether the HCP was negligent in not transfusing
the patient to prevent shock, the panel could very well consider such
compound hearsay and base its opinion concerning negligence upon
it. How is the cross-examiner to refute such an opinion before a
jury? Will he ask a panel member before the jury whether or not
their opinion was based on this nurse's conversation with the am-
bulance driver? Conversely, an HCP, writing a self-serving record
and realizing it may go before the panel, could unduly influence the
panel members under these relaxed rules of evidence. The absence
of such rules will create more evils than it will cure, particularly
since the opinion will be introduced into evidence.
Further difficulty arises over the fact that not only is a written
opinion impossible to cross-examine, but it also apparently will not
contain the facts upon which it is based. 7 Traditionally, expert
opinion evidence is admissible at trial only if all of the facts upon
63. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14(3). See text accompanying note 42 supra for the text of the
constitutional provision.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-914 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-916(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
66. Boone v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 695, 194 S.E.2d 689 (1973).
67. See note 27 supra.
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which the opinion is based are stated. This gives the only ground-
work for the cross-examiner to undercut that opinion. If the facts
are not presented upon which the opinion is based, it is impossible
to attack the opinion. It seems too idealistic to expect the panel
members to fully explain everything if called as witnesses at the
subsequent trial. As long as there are seven persons sitting on the
panel rendering the same opinion, it would be highly unlikely that
each of them would agree to all of the facts upon which their opinion
was based. Moreover, to call the seven panel members to the trial
of the case would be an administrative nightmare. For example,
would the chairman/judge claim immunity under some concept of
judicial immunity?68 Suppose a lawyer/panelist dissents, and at
trial is called as a witness. To what extent can the lawyer calling
him ask that he express his "medical" opinion? In reality, what
difference will it make to the jury that a lawyer dissented in a
medical issue?
The last criticism of allowing the opinion of the panel to be intro-
duced into evidence is the potential abuse of the true value of the
opinion by one of the parties. Conceivably, in an opinion favoring
the plaintiff, a majority vote could consist of the votes of the three
lawyers with the chairman/judge breaking the deadlock. Thus, the
curious anomaly of an opinion that an HCP violated a reasonable
medical standard of care could be given by an all-lawyer majority.
The counter-argument to this observation is that this is precisely
what was happening on the Joint Screening Panels in the past.
68. Pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1975), judges are not "competent to
testify in any criminal or civil proceeding as to any matter which shall have come before him
in the course of his official duties .... " Id. At the moment, this statute has only been
interpreted so as to protect the criminally accused from testimony by judges. Baylor v.
Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116, 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949). However, the malpractice act implies that
a judge could testify in the subsequent malpractice case, and unless section 19.2-271 is
extended to civil cases, it would appear the judge would have to testify if called, or at least
give a deposition to be used de bene esse since judges are generally excused from having to
testify in court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-313 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Since the judge can only vote
in the case of a deadlock among the rest of the panel, he may be spared from being called as
a witness in most cases. However, the calling of the judge as a witness raises serious questions.
As a practical matter, what attorney, practicing before that same judge, would be willing to
enter into a vigorous cross-examination of His Honor? What impact would the fact that he is
a judge in a circuit court of the Commonwealth of Virginia have upon the jury when he
rendered an opinion that the defendant HCP was guilty or not guilty of malpractice? Surely
a circuit judge would not relish the idea of being questioned as to why he voted a certain way.
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However, this is not true. The Joint Screening Panel was com-
prised of three lawyers and three doctors and their opinion was
determined by a majority vote. Therefore, in order to render an
opinion, at least one physician must have held that the defendant
HCP fell below the reasonable medical standard of care.
An argument could be made not to have lawyers on the panel at
all. As a practical matter, the presence of lawyers on either panel is
to ensure that the panel's opinion is not subject to criticism of being
a "white-wash." This statement is not in any way a criticism of an
all-physician panel; indeed, the physicians themselves have recog-
nized the potential criticism that could be levied against an all-
physician panel and, by their agreement with the Virginia State Bar
structuring the Joint Screening Panel to be comprised of both law-
yers and doctors, have freed themselves from such suspicion.
In any event, the panel should be comprised of an even number
of members, equal both as to doctors and lawyers. This would en-
sure at least one physician being in the majority in holding against
an HCP. So structured, the panel comprises an objective body of
sophisticated members who could carefully screen the facts.
As a suggested alternative, rather than allowing the opinion of the
panel to be introduced into evidence, would it not be better to re-
quire one of the three physician members who voted in favor of the
claimant to testify on his behalf at the subsequent trial?
Furthermore, a claimant or HCP could "increase" or "diminish"
a panel opinion of degree of disability before a jury by utilizing his
countering expert twice-once before the panel and once at trial.
For example, assume the hospital records show a 50% disability
but this was countered by an expert for the HCP as being only 20%.
It is very likely the panel will compromise between these two fig-
ures, rendering an opinion that the disability is 35%. Should the
HCP, at trial, again call upon the same expert to express his same
opinion of 20%, the result could very well be a second compromise
that would be somewhat unfair. The reverse could also happen.
It should also be noted here that there may be a problem with the
rule that a party can rise no higher than the evidence he offers.69
69. See Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).
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May the person seeking to introduce the opinion bring in another
witness either to raise or lower the amount of liability fixed by the
panel, or is he bound by the opinion once having introduced it?
The last constitutional question regarding the legislature's at-
tempt to alleviate the medical malpractice problem in Virginia is
the recovery limitation of $750,000.70 Assuming that the $750,000
limit on verdicts in medical malpractice cases is supposed to help
the HCP's with their malpractice insurance premiums by limiting
the amount of the plaintiff's recovery, it seems that this is an exer-
cise in futility. Under the usual insurance rating practices, the bulk
of the premium paid by an insured usually goes to the first one
hundred thousand dollars worth of insurance coverage. The cost to
insure for additional amounts over and above the first hundred
thousand dollars or so of insurance coverage is relatively small when
compared to the initial outlay for the basic coverage. Therefore,
what is being accomplished by this limitation?7'
The Supreme Court of Illinois has struck down a $500,000 medical
malpractice limitation as being "arbitrary and constituting a spe-
cial law" in violation of the Illinois Constitution.72 In rendering this
opinion, the Supreme Court of Illinois discussed the Workmen's
Compensation Act and differentiated it from the proposed medical
malpractice limitation of $500,000. The Illinois court reasoned:
Defendants argue that there is a societal quid pro quo in that the loss
of recovery potential to some malpractice victims is offset by 'lower
insurance premiums and lower medical care costs for all recipients of
medical care.' This quid pro quo does not extend to the seriously
injured medical malpractice victim and does not serve to bring the
limited recovery provision within the rationale of the cases upholding
the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act.13
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
71. It is interesting to note that in Virginia from 1970-75, no claim for medical malpractice
was reported in excess of $500,000 and only one claim was settled for $250,000 (SCC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 28), and that the average verdict against a physician in 1975 was approxi-
mately $10,000 (id. at 19). However, in early 1976, a plaintiff obtained a verdict of $725,000
against several HCP's jointly. Baley v. Luthey, No. 12229 (Hampton Cir. Ct., May 25, 1976).
72. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
73. Id. at 8. The United States Supreme Court upheld the limits imposed by a workman's
compensation act, but there the injured party was entitled to recover without a showing of
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The Illinois court also discussed and contrasted its wrongful death
act and dram shop act (each of which contained a limitation on the
amount of recovery) with a medical malpractice limitation and held
that since the wrongful death act and the dram shop act of Illinois
were both created by the legislature and did not exist as causes of
action at common law, the legislature had the right to limit the
plaintiff's recovery under those two acts. Such was not the case
concerning medical malpractice. The right to recover damages for
injuries arising from medical malpractice existed at common law
and, hence, the legislature could not constitutionally limit the
amount of damages, because such legislation would constitute "a
special law. ' 74 Surely the Virginia Act constitutes special legislation
if it affords no opportunity to recover damages in excess of a set
amount even if the actual injuries are clearly above that amount.
Undoubtedly, the quid pro quo of such an act leaves the claimant
with no real gain. In exchange for his right to full recovery if his
damages are in excess of the limit, the claimant gets nothing (al-
though society theoretically benefits from supposedly lower rates).
Does not the Virginia statute's attempt to limit the common law
right of recovery for medical malpractice to the sum of $750,000
likewise constitute special legislation? In effect, does it not also
attempt to "change the rules of evidence in a judicial proceeding"
regarding the amount of damages that the plaintiff can recover in a
medical malpractice suit?
III. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the Virginia legislature's solution to the
medical malpractice problems poses many problems, both from a
constitutional and practical point of view. It is inevitable that the
law will be challenged and will probably undergo extensive changes.
As a practical matter, the greatest problem created by the legisla-
tion is the ability to admit into evidence the opinion of the panel.
This could be unworkable in the actual day-to-day trial of cases. A
better course of action might be for the panel to render its opinion
fault by the employer. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). See also
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
74. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
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and not let the opinion be introduced per se into evidence, but
rather allow the doctors on the panel to be subpoenaed by the claim-
ant at the forthcoming trial of the case.
At the present time, the panel seems to be more than a "screening
panel." Because of the far-reaching consequences of its opinion,
coupled with the high cost of utilizing the panel, the effect may be
to chill the ardor of those persons contemplating using it. The
jointly sponsored medico-legal screening committee, now defunct,
with some minor adaptations and perhaps partially funded by the
state, has all of the attributes of the present malpractice review
panel without its drawbacks.
In short, this appears to be "stop-gap" legislation, drafted hastily
and without properly considering the consequences that flow there-
from. As such, its worth is inversely proportional to the haste with
which it was drafted and enacted. It is doubtful that it will serve
the purposes and needs of the medical community, nor is it likely
to serve the needs of potential claimants who have been victims of
negligence on the part of HCP's.
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